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ABSTRACT 
There has been a standing debate in the field regarding the effectiveness of 
frequencies and probabilities to accurately convey information.  This study utilized a 
naturalistic sampling procedure to determine risk preferences on binary choice decision 
using time, sex, and goal deficit variables as predictors.  Participants consisted of 110 
undergraduate students enrolled in core psychology courses at Fort Hays State 
University.  A web application was created to conduct this specific study that will be 
made available to other researchers.  Significant effects existed for time and goal deficit 
variables that predicted risk preferences. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the Midwest, it is common to hear phrases such as, “I could be the weather 
man, that is the only job I know where you are paid to be wrong most of the time!”  
Maybe the forecaster is not wrong as often as one would think, but instead the typical 
interpretations of the forecast are inaccurate.  Weather forecasters commonly present the 
likelihood of a weather event occurring as a percentage (e.g., a 50% chance of rain).  
However, the average person would have difficulty explaining what a 50% chance of rain 
actually means.  This format of presenting a chance of rain gives a single-event 
probability, which does not accurately describe the scenario (Gigerenzer, Hertwig, van 
den Broeck, Fasolo, & Katsikopoulos, 2005).  Instead, Gigerenzer et al. (2005) believe 
that a reference class should be attached to these forecasts to facilitate better 
understanding.  Therefore, a forecast of a 50% chance of rain tomorrow should also 
include that it means that it will rain on 50% of days like tomorrow.  In essence, it will 
either rain or it will not rain, but on days like tomorrow half of them will receive rain. 
 Correctly interpreting probabilistic statements, such as the weather forecast, can 
be improved in another manner.  Presenting people with a frequency (e.g., 5 out of 10) 
instead of a probability or percent tends to improve performance (Brase, Cosmides, & 
Tooby, 1998; Gigerenzer et al., 2005; Hill & Brase, 2012).  Therefore, instead of 
presenting a 50% chance of rain to the viewing public, it would be better understood 
when presented as 5 out of 10 days like tomorrow will receive rain (Gigerenzer et al., 
2005; Hill & Brase, 2012).  In this instance, it is easier to interpret that 10 days like 
tomorrow are being compared, and in five of them it rains.   
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 Similar effects have also been observed in medical decision-making.  When 
discussing side effects, patients may be unsettled to hear that there is a 30% chance that 
they will develop some side effect, but much more at ease when it is communicated as a 
frequency, or that 3 in 10 people develop this side effect (Gigerenzer et al., 2005; Reyna, 
Nelson, Han, & Dieckmann, 2009).  Rather than interpreting they may experience this 
side effect 30% of the time while they are taking a prescribed medication, patients can 
more easily see that they may not develop a side effect at all unless they are one of the 
three people out of 10. 
Problems Evaluating Probabilities 
 Humans tend to have difficulty comprehending the odds of an event occurring and 
there are several potential explanations that include decision weights (Fox & Tversky, 
1998; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), format of odds presentation (Brase et al., 1998; 
Gigerenzer et al., 2005; Hill & Brase, 2012), and framing effects (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981).  These factors tend to skew probability estimates, resulting in choices that may be 
less than optimal.  An optimal choice is defined as the one whose product of probability 
(ranging from 0 to 1) and outcome (e.g., gain or loss of a monetary outcome) minus the 
cost of the choice yields the greatest final value.  This formula is similar to that found in 
expected-utility theory (Friedman & Savage, 1952), but includes a “cost to play” that is 
derived from energy requirements in optimal foraging theory (MacArthur & Pianka, 
1966). 
 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) introduced a decision weight function that 
describes how people estimate given probabilities.  The function illustrates an over-
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estimation of low probability events occurring and an under-estimation of high 
probability events occurring.  This would present a discrepancy between objective values 
of choices and subjective values of these choices when calculating expected value.  
Decision makers, utilizing this decision weight function, would then over-value choices 
with a lower probability and under-value choices with a higher probability.  Depending 
upon the content of options presented, this could lead to sub-optimal decisions. 
 Humans tend to lack proficiency when interpreting probabilities and percentages, 
and are better equipped to interpret odds presented in a frequency format (Brase et al., 
1998; Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer, 1991; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995).  
People cannot directly observe probabilities in nature, instead events are viewed 
discretely as either occurring or not occurring and information about probabilities are 
synthesized.  It has been suggested that human evolution has led to mechanisms that are 
sensitive to counting the frequency of events occurring and not occurring (e.g., Brase et 
al., 1998; Hill & Brase, 2012).  Decisions can then be made based on these actual, whole-
number observations.  Interpreting a probability of some event occurring that is equal to 
.67 is more difficult than understanding that some event occurs two out of three times.  
Misinterpretations of these probabilities may also lead to sub-optimal decisions. 
 How a choice is framed has also been shown to affect interpretations of risk (e.g., 
De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1981).  Prospect theory postulates that people avoid risk when a choice is 
framed as a gain, and people seek risk when the choice is framed as a loss (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  That is, certainty is desired to gain a 
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reward even if approaching certainty decreases the amount of the reward.  When all 
choice options would result in a loss, choice behavior shifts away from selecting the 
option that is closer to certainty and illustrates a desire to seek risk in an effort to prevent 
such a loss from occurring.  For example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found that 
decision makers preferred choosing an option that presented an 80% chance of losing 
$4,000 over a sure loss of $3,000.  This is despite the fact that the sure loss of $3,000 is 
of a higher expected value (-$3,000 * 1.0 = -$3,000 > -$4,000 * .80 = -$3,200).  This 
seems to point to some level of emotional subjectivity involved in making decisions.  De 
Martino et al. (2006) reported that there is heightened amygdala activity present during 
decisions, suggesting an emotional component involved in the decision making process.  
Framing a decision as a loss instead of gain (or vice versa) could result in a sub-optimal 
decision. 
Effects of Reference Points and Time 
 Making an optimal decision based on expected utility may not always be the best 
decision in every circumstance.  It is hypothesized that humans use points of reference to 
evaluate choices based on what is important to them.  These reference points have 
included a minimum requirement that represents an amount of something (e.g., calories 
from food) that must be possessed for an organism to survive (MacArthur & Pianka, 
1966; Stephens, 1981; Stephens, 1987; Stephens & Krebs, 1986), a status quo that 
represents a current state where falling below this level is a painful loss and exceeding it 
brings some pleasure (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Wang & Johnson, 2012), and a social 
comparison or goal reference point that represents some achievement of one’s peers 
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(Festinger, 1954; Hill & Buss, 2010).  These reference points have been identified as 
affecting risk preferences in certain scenarios.  Risk, in this context, shall be defined as a 
choice in a binary pair with the lowest probability of occurrence.  In recent history, there 
has been research examining combinations of two or more of these reference points (e.g., 
Koop & Johnson, 2012; Wang & Johnson, 2012). 
 Optimal foraging theory (MacArthur & Pianka, 1966; Stephens, 1981; Stephens, 
1987; Stephens & Krebs, 1986) predicts an organism will assume any risk necessary in 
order to survive.  That is, when presented with two options, with only one option 
allowing for the minimum requirement (MR) for survival to be met, that should be the 
preferred option—even if its likelihood of occurrence is minimal and the other option 
presents a much greater likelihood.  When the options are framed as gains, it presents a 
contradiction to predictions about risk preference in prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979); where, when faced with a gain, the option that is closest to certainty 
would be preferred.  Perhaps the organism faced with this choice reframes the decision as 
a loss where one option is a certain loss of life and the other presents some risk that could 
allow life to continue.  This is logical, because the less risky option with a lower reward 
presents a choice that would certainly result in death, while the other option provides 
some chance at continuation of life.  Though prospect theory does account for some 
editing processes to occur when evaluating choices (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), these 
functions do not include an edit that allows reframing of the option (i.e., framing a gain 
as a loss instead, or framing a loss as a gain instead).  It does seem that the MR reference 
point offers further predictive value that cannot be entirely explained by prospect theory. 
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 Assuming that both options presented to an organism allow for the MR to be met, 
something must guide the decision at this point.  Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed 
that decisions are made in reference to the status quo (SQ).  The SQ generally refers to 
some amount of wealth (e.g., money or calories) that is currently held by the decision 
maker, or a zero point.  Options that exceed the SQ are gains and options that fall short 
are losses.  Since humans avoid risk in the face of gains and seek risk in the face of losses 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), if both options exceed the SQ, choosing the one that 
presents the greatest probability of occurrence would be expected.  If neither option 
meets the SQ, selection of the riskier choice would be expected; if one option exceeds the 
SQ and the other option does not, then the option that exceeds the SQ should be chosen 
despite any associated risk. 
 However, there are some problems with this model.  If neither option meets the 
SQ, then risk is expected to be preferred according to prospect theory (Kahaneman & 
Tversky, 1979).  But, what if this riskier option also presents a possibility of falling 
below the MR while the less risky option does not?  Some researchers have proposed the 
combination of the MR and SQ into a single theory that could help to predict choices in 
this very circumstance (Koop & Johnson, 2012; Wang & Johnson, 2012).   
 In addition to the MR and SQ reference points, there is one additional point to 
consider.  Social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) states an individual may choose to 
assume some level of risk in order to outperform a peer.  These decisions are 
understandable from an evolutionary perspective, as males higher in status have greater 
access to potential mates (Ha, Overbeek, & Engels, 2010).  However, this kind of risk-
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seeking behavior is not predicted by prospect theory since it would require one to seek 
risk when faced with a gain.  This social comparison reference point has been adapted 
and referred to as a goal (G) reference point (e.g., Koop & Johnson, 2012; Wang & 
Johnson, 2012). 
 Many previous decision-making studies have utilized single-event decision tasks 
where the effects of time are not evaluated (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Koop & 
Johnson, 2012; Thaler & Johnson, 1990; Wang & Johnson, 2012).  However, in nature, 
time is a factor that may influence choices (MacArthur & Pianka, 1966).  For this reason, 
a task that seeks high ecological validity should account for the effects of time.  College 
students are faced with deadlines, such as rent and utilities, which may illustrate a 
modern-day survival problem.  Failure to pay these bills before the deadline may result in 
loss of shelter, water, or heat.  As the deadline for these bills becomes closer (i.e., amount 
of time decreases) there should be less risk taken that could result in failure to meet these 
deadlines, such as allocating current wealth to goods or services not necessary for 
survival.  In this framework, this behavior would result in the preference for the option 
representing the greatest risk, in terms of probability of payout. 
THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
 The present study aims to evaluate risk preferences over a series of trials while 
manipulating the budget and goal amounts.  A web-based program will be created that 
allows participants to select their preferred gambles, or prospects, and will be provided 
feedback about the outcome of their choice.  This method will allow participants to 
naturally sample their environment and receive immediate feedback after each choice. 
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Predictions 
 Utilizing tri-reference point theory (Wang & Johnson, 2012), and incorporating a 
time component, should afford ecological validity to a decision task.  Tri-reference point 
theory incorporates the MR from optimal foraging theory, the SQ from prospect theory, 
and the G from social comparison theory and predicts choices based on the relationship 
between the options presented and the value of each of these reference points (Wang & 
Johnson, 2012).  By incorporating the time component, a task would better represent 
decisions that are made outside of a laboratory setting. 
 Several predictions can be made based on prior empirical findings.  First, all 
effort will be given to meet a MR and survive (Caraco et al., 1980; MacArthur & Pianka, 
1966; Stephens & Krebs, 1986).  Second, if MR is met, risk will be avoided when the 
options presented are framed as gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  Third, if SQ is met 
then risk may be taken to outperform competitors (Festinger, 1954; Hill & Buss, 2010).  
Fourth, interactions are expected between time and reference points.  It is also expected 
that using a frequency format will result in optimal decisions more often than when using 
probability format (i.e., probabilities or percentages).  These predictions lead to the 
following hypotheses: 
H1: As budget-goal difference increases, preference for risk will also increase. 
H2: As time passes (trials remaining decreases), preference for risk will increase. 
H3: Males are expected to assume more risk than females. 
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H4: Budget-goal difference and time are expected to interact such that a large 
budget-goal difference at a later time (fewer trials remaining) will lead to greater 
preference for risk. 
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
Expected Utility Theory 
 Expected values of a monetary choice can be calculated by determining the 
possible outcomes that would occur with equal chance, or determining how many wins 
and losses out of 100 could be expected, and summing the amounts awarded, or lost, in 
each outcome and dividing by the total number of outcomes, 100 (Bernoulli, 1954).  
Mathematically, this method of calculating risk would be equivalent to multiplying the 
possible rewards or losses by their respective probabilities of occurrence.  This 
calculation of expected values is not unique to expected utility theory; other theories use 
this method for calculating expected values (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).   
 Unique to expected utility theory is the idea that decision-makers assign a 
subjective value to potential gains or losses that varies as a function of their “lifetime 
wealth” (Bernoulli, 1954).  The term utility, in this context, refers to the usefulness of a 
potential gain to the individual faced with the opportunity to make a risky decision, or a 
decision where there is a chance that they will not win a stated amount for sure.  A 
wealthy person would gain less utility from $10 than a poor person would, as the $10 is 
more useful (i.e., has greater utility) to the poor person than it is to the wealthy person.  
Intuitively, this idea makes sense; someone who struggles to feed him or herself, or their 
family, may have the opportunity to do so with a $10 increase in wealth, whereas the 
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wealthy person would only increase their own wealth by a very small percentage.  The 
utility function is concave, but little additional information has been incorporated into 
previous works involving expected utility theory (Rabin, 2000).  The concavity of this 
function predicts changes in subjective valuations of monetary amounts.  For example, 
$10 may not actually be twice as attractive as $5 because of diminishing returns.  For this 
reason, expected utility theory is not an appropriate lens to approach decisions in which 
each option presents differing monetary rewards. 
 Some literature has pointed to potential flaws in expected utility theory, 
specifically when it pertains to defining and measuring utility.  Friedman and Savage 
(1952) reference this very problem suggesting that definitions of utility lack specificity 
and measurements of it lack validity.  Nevertheless, the evidence in support of the theory 
outweighs the evidence against it, and no competing theories predicted decisions 
involving risk with significantly greater accuracy at the time of publication (Friedman & 
Savage, 1952).  Despite these limitations, many elements in later theories (e.g., 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) closely resemble those introduced in expected utility 
theory. 
Prospect Theory 
 Prospect theory was developed as a model to predict human behavior in tasks 
with simple prospects (gambles) that include stated probabilities of monetary payouts 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  This iconic work uncovered several tendencies in human 
behavior.  Notably, people prefer to avoid risk.  In fact, the pressure to avoid risk is so 
strong that avoiding perceived losses seems to be more than twice as important as 
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increasing wealth (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  This statement should be interpreted 
with caution as effects of the frame of prospects can reverse this trend.  That is, when a 
prospect is framed as a gain (chance of winning money) with moderate to large 
probabilities, the trend is toward risk avoidance.  However, if the problem is framed as a 
loss (chance of losing money) with large to moderate probabilities of occurrence, the 
preference shifts towards risk-seeking (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kaheman & 
Tversky, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  These terms, gain and loss, illustrate 
another important concept from this theory; it is implied that the decision-maker either 
knows or creates a baseline wealth level to which they compare presented prospects.  It is 
in comparison to this reference point where prospects are judged on the amount of a loss 
or gain that they represent.  The previous examples have mentioned the requirement for 
moderate to large probabilities because if low probability prospects are presented, 
preferences shift toward the option with the larger monetary outcome even if expected 
values are equal.  Expected value is calculated by multiplying the monetary outcome by 
the probability that it will occur and subtracting the cost to play (if cost is present in the 
task). 
 The following example illustrates these effects: when presented either an 80% 
chance of winning $4,000 (or $0 otherwise) or a 100% chance of winning $3,000, nearly 
80% of people choose the certain outcome even though its expected value ($3,000) is 
actually less than the alternative ($3,200), but riskier, option (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979).  If the frame of the same prospect is reversed, the outcome is quite different.  So, 
when presented an 80% chance of losing $4,000 (or losing nothing otherwise) or a certain 
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$3,000 loss, then 92% of people choose the 80% chance of losing the larger amount even 
though the expected value (-$3,200) is less than the alternative (-$3,000) (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979).  This particular example clearly illustrates the risk preferences described 
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979).  The preference was for the certain option when the 
prospect was framed as gaining money, but the preference was for the uncertain option 
when the same prospect was framed as losing money. 
 Decision weights.  Central to prospect theory is the idea that outcomes carry 
some amount of subjective weight.  Kahneman and Tversky (1979) mapped this decision 
weight curve (Figure 1) to model that losses carry a psychological value larger than an 
equivalent gain. 
 
Figure 1. Decision weight curve (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  The psychological 
value of gains increases at a slower rate than the rate of decrease of the psychological 
value of equivalent losses. 
 
 This discrepancy in psychological values between losses and gains illustrate the 
idea that people avoid risk.  Again, this only applies in positive frames with moderate to 
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large probabilities.  To understand this phenomenon Kaheman and Tversky (1979) 
considered how people perceive probability information.  In general, people tend to 
overestimate low probabilities and underestimate high probabilities.  For example, 
estimates and actual probabilities are equal at zero, and the estimate curve lies above the 
actual probability until approximately 35%, then falls and remains below the actual 
probability line until 100% where it again aligns with the actual probability line (Figure 
2). 
 
Figure 2.  Probability estimates that contribute to decision weights as proposed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
 
 The basic formula for prospect theory calculates a weighted value rather than a 
true expected value, which is based on decision weights (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
This formula is illustrated as V = πp(x), where V is the subjective value of the prospect, π 
is the decision weight assigned to the prospect by the decision-maker, p is the probability 
that the prospect will pay out, and x is the monetary award if the prospect pays out.  
Prospect theory would predict that the prospect with the largest V will be the one 
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preferred most often.  Since p and x are held constant within a single prospect, π is the 
only value that can change in the equation (from one person to the next) that would affect 
V and, ultimately, which prospect is preferred. 
 It is important to note that decision weights are not a measure of perceived 
likelihood, but rather a relative impact the prospect would have on the decision-maker 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  This means that the decision weights assigned to each 
prospect may not sum to one as probabilities will (i.e., there will be some outcome 
following a choice).  Instead, these weights tend to reduce the value of a prospect below 
what would be calculated using expected-value theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
The utility, or usefulness, and probability of payout are expected to influence decision 
weights assigned to a prospect.  A prospect that presents a loss of money should increase 
the decision weight more, per unit increase in (the absolute value of) money, than a 
prospect that presents a potential gain (see Figure 1).  Additionally, unit increases for low 
probability occurrences are expected to result in greater increases to decision weights 
than the same increase at higher probabilities (see Figure 2). 
 For example, the earlier prospect presented will be reexamined.  The first option 
presents an 80% chance of winning $4,000 (and a 20% of winning $0) and the second 
option presents a 100% chance of winning $3,000.  The first option, again, has an 
expected value (EV), the p(x) part of the equation, of $3,200.  This is calculated as 
follows: EV = (0.80)($4,000) + (0.20)($0) = $3,200.  The second option has an expected 
value of $3,000, calculated by EV = (1.0)($3,000) = $3,000.  However, Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) noted that far more decision makers preferred the second option to the 
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first.  The idea for this choice is that the decision weight, π, assigned to each prospect 
differs enough to make the value, V, greater for the second prospect.  Hypothetically, if a 
decision weight of 0.55 is assigned to the first option and a weight of 1.0 is assigned to 
the second, then the second option actually represents a greater subjective value: V1 = 
(0.55)(0.80)($4,000) + (0.84)(0.20)($0) = $1,760 and V2 = (1.0)(1.0)($3,000) = $3,000.  
Based on these values, calculated with decision weights, option two should now be the 
preferred option.  If we look at the loss-framed example with the same decision weights, 
it becomes clear that option one, valued at -$1,760, is now greater than and should be 
preferred to option two, valued at -$3,000. 
Optimal Foraging Theory 
 Prospect theory and optimal foraging theory, specifically risk-sensitive foraging, 
share some commonality in that the risk preferences depend on the current conditions 
facing the decision-maker (Houston, Fawcett, Mallpress, & McNamara, 2014).  Prospect 
theory discusses current wealth, or status quo, as a reference point to judge against 
potential prospects (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), while risk-sensitive foraging evaluates 
energy budgets of the decision-maker (Stephens & Krebs, 1986).  It is from the 
comparison of these current state reference points to presented choices that risk-aversive 
or risk-seeking behaviors stem.  For instance, when considering wealth, humans will 
make a risky choice in order to avoid falling below the status quo, but not to exceed this 
level; when considering energy budgets in animals, risk will be taken to gain enough 
calories to survive, but not to forage for excess calories (Houston et al., 2014; 
McDermott, Fowler, & Smirnov, 2008).  This represents diminishing returns for gains 
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above the status quo, in prospect theory, or the minimum calorie requirement, in risk-
sensitive foraging. 
 The risk-sensitive foraging model.  The following is a simple illustration of risk-
sensitive foraging involving two squirrels.  The first squirrel is in a low energy budget; 
therefore, it needs to forage for a large number of calories before the end of the day or it 
will certainly die.  The second squirrel is in a high energy budget and only needs a small 
number of calories to survive.  Both squirrels have the option to forage in two different 
patches, one which almost always provides a small number of calories; and one that 
infrequently provides an abundance of calories.  The question becomes, which squirrel 
should choose which patch?  Since the second squirrel is in a high energy budget, its best 
chances of survival would come from foraging in the first patch.  This patch would 
almost certainly provide the small number of calories required by this squirrel.  However, 
the first squirrel would not gain the number of calories it needs to survive by foraging in 
the first patch.  The first squirrel’s best chance for survival would come from foraging in 
the second patch where there is at least a possibility of gaining the number of calories it 
requires to survive, no matter how small the probability of successful foraging.  This is 
risk-sensitive foraging in a nutshell. 
 Many terms used in the following descriptions revolve around the idea that 
foraging environments elicit varying rates of success and payoff amounts.  This 
variability is also central to other decision models, including prospect theory (e.g., 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  Various studies describe providing two sources of food, 
one with a small but certain payout and another with a large but uncertain payout (e.g., 
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Caraco, Martindale, & Whittam, 1980; Stephens, 1981; Stephens & Krebs, 1986).  It is 
important to note that each option pays out the same mean amount, or expected value.  
That is, the average payout over several trials for each choice is mathematically 
equivalent.  The difference lies in the single-event payouts or the likelihood that a 
specific option will pay out at the time it is selected.  The following explanations will 
refer to risk as selecting the patch with the more variable payout schedule, not the risk of 
predation which is the common definition of risk in optimal foraging literature (Stephens 
& Krebs, 1986). 
 Important to the risk-sensitive foraging model for predicting risk preferences is 
the concept of energy budgets.  Essentially, risk becomes preferred in expected low (or 
negative) daily energy budgets and risk is avoided in expected high (or positive) daily 
energy budgets (Caraco et al., 1980; Stephens & Krebs, 1986).  For the present purposes, 
low energy budget shall be defined as a caloric requirement greater than can be provided 
by the certain or lower risk option presented in the time (i.e., number of trials) remaining.  
The high energy budget shall then be defined as a caloric requirement that can be met by 
the certain or lower risk option presented in the time remaining.  These definitions 
closely resemble those described by Caraco et al. (1980). 
 Another consideration of risk-sensitive foraging is time pressure; energy budget 
and time act together to determine risk preferences (Caraco et al., 1980).  For instance, 
when observing an animal with a low energy budget (high calorie requirement) at two 
different points in time during the day, its risk preference would likely differ.  When 
there is ample time remaining in the day to forage for food this animal is expected to 
 18 
 
avoid risk in exchange for certain, or highly probable, food payouts.  However, when 
time is scarce there is an expected shift toward risk preference to achieve a potentially 
higher food payout compared to the less risky option.  This shift in risk preference may 
be due to framing effects posed in this foraging dilemma (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  That is, early in the 
day foraging may be approached as gaining calories to continue life (a positive frame), 
while later in the day the same problem may be approached as gaining calories to avoid 
death (a negative frame).  In this perspective it is assumed that gaining calories beyond a 
need level (or increasing wealth in prospect theory) presents less of a pressure to take risk 
than gaining calories to meet a need level (or avoid a loss in prospect theory).  Logically, 
this makes sense as survival is assured if a need level is met, but death is certain if the 
forager fails to meet their need level.  As time, or the number of opportunities to find 
food, decreases then the caloric requirement per unit of time must increase.  If this need 
ratio (calories/time unit) exceeds what can be provided by the less risky patch, then the 
optimal survival choice would be to seek larger caloric payouts in a less certain patch. 
Social Comparison 
 Humans are not solely motivated by their current wealth when it comes to making 
decisions.  Comparison to peers who are similar in status has been proposed to explain 
why risk is sought when doing so is not the optimal, or most beneficial, choice (Festinger, 
1954).  Social comparison theory describes a shift towards risk preference when doing so 
presents a chance that the decision-maker can advance on the social hierarchy to achieve 
higher status than comparable peers.  Dominance theory approaches the same question 
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from an evolutionary perspective and has offered similar predictions and biological 
explanations for this behavior (e.g., Ermer, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2008; Hill & Buss, 
2010).  This theory explains the necessity of an equal status competitor to elicit risk 
taking. 
 Consider two animals in direct competition for a mate.  If one animal is high in 
status and the other low, it would make little sense for either to engage the other in a 
fight.  High status animals reach their rank by winning fights with others and are usually 
larger and more experienced than low status animals.  The high status animal would gain 
very little by fighting a low status animal, but would risk losing its status.  The low status 
animal, however, does have much to gain and little to lose, but defeating the high status 
animal in a fight presents a low chance of success and a chance of death.  When this 
status mismatch is present, it is expected that neither animal will seek risk and would 
benefit more from remaining risk averse.  However, when two animals that are equal in 
status have an opportunity to fight for status, risk-seeking behavior should be observed.  
That is, the opportunity to move up the social hierarchy is most salient in this scenario 
since size and experience mismatches are less likely to occur for animals equal in status. 
 There are three requirements for the shift from risk aversion to risk preference to 
occur; the more variable outcome must offer the chance to best competitors while the less 
variable one cannot, the choice must relate to the ability to solve a social problem, and 
the choices must be framed as gains rather than losses (Hill & Buss, 2010).  It is also 
important to note, as stated above, that this shift in preferences only occurs in the context 
of competition with, or observation by, someone equal in status (Ermer et al., 2008).  
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This implies that the effect would not be seen when there is a status mismatch between 
the decision-maker under observation and either a competitor or the observer. 
Decisions Under Uncertainty 
 When choosing between options that are equal, people tend to make a choice 
based on whether the probability information is stated or withheld, and favoring the 
option with stated probability (Rode, Cosmides, Hell, & Tooby, 1999).  This effect 
results in decisions that may not be optimal and has been termed the ambiguity effect.  
This effect may best be represent by the work in Ellsberg (1961) where participants were 
offered a choice between two urns containing some proportion of red and black balls.  
One of the urns contained a known ratio of 50% red and 50% black balls, and the other 
contained an unknown ratio of 100 red and black balls.  When offered a reward if a 
specific color was drawn, $100 if a red ball is drawn and $0 otherwise, participants prefer 
to select the urn with the 50-50 red to black ratio.  Once the ball is returned they are again 
offered the same prize, $100 for a match and $0 otherwise, but this time for a black ball, 
and again the 50-50 urn is preferred.  The probability of winning either the first time or 
the second time by choosing the 50-50 urn is 50%.  Since there are two colors that are 
each selected to win once, this would represent the minimum probability of winning once 
by selecting the second urn with the unknown ratio.  That is, if there were the same 50-50 
distribution of red and black balls in the unknown urn then the probability would be the 
same.  But, if the ratio were different then at least one of the two trials must present a 
chance greater than 50% of winning $100. 
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 More recent work has found evidence to suggest that this effect is not always 
adhered to and can, in some cases, even be reversed (e.g., Rode et al., 1999).  In this 
work, one experiment revealed that subjects were sensitive to outcome variables and 
selected the option with the lowest outcome variability, or risk, which in this case was the 
ambiguous option (Rode et al., 1999).  This study was presented very similar to the one 
mention above in Ellsberg (1961), where there were boxes with black or white balls 
presented and monetary award for drawing the one matching a specified color.  The 
major difference is that this choice was offered to each participant 10 times.  In a 
subsequent experiment, Rode et al. (1999) examined preferences when there was a need 
level to be met.  The problem was presented similar to the previous experiment (one box 
with a known distribution of black and white balls and the other with an unknown 
distribution) and participants were informed that they must draw a certain number of 
black balls to advance to the second stage of the lottery.  When the minimum requirement 
was greater than the mean outcome, expected value, of the known distribution box, 
participants’ preferences shifted to the ambiguous, or risky, box. 
Sex Differences 
 Males and females have been found to differ in their individual preferences for 
risk.  Typically, males exhibit greater risk-seeking behaviors than females across domains 
such as gambling, recreation, and health decisions (e.g., Eckel & Grossman, 2002; Harris 
et al., 2006).  One explanation for this difference is perceptions of negative outcomes 
(higher for females) and expected enjoyment (lower for females; Harris et al., 2006).  
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Because of greater expectation of negative consequences and a lower level of expected 
enjoyment, females are not as motivated as males to engage in risky behaviors. 
HYPOTHESES 
Risk sensitive foraging predicts that organisms will assume greater risk when 
facing an energy deficit (Stephens & Krebs, 1986).  Additionally, tri-reference point 
theory predicts similar behavior in order to reach the next reference point (Wang & 
Johnson, 2012).  These prior findings lead to the first hypothesis: as budget-goal 
difference increases, preference for risk will also increase. 
As organisms face time pressure in order to reach a minimum aspiration level, 
they will take more risk in order to forage enough calories to survive (Stephens & Krebs, 
1986).  Assuming that the minimum aspiration level has not been met and all else 
remains constant, as time passes (trials remaining decreases), preference for risk will 
increase. 
Since females expect more negative outcomes from taking risk and less 
enjoyment than males (Harris et al., 2006), males are expected to assume more risk than 
females. 
 Budget-goal difference and time are expected to interact such that a large budget-
goal difference at a later time (fewer trials remaining) will lead to greater preference for 
risk.  Risk sensitive foraging predicts that animals in a negative energy budget will seek 
more risk under time pressure than, both, the same animal without time pressure or and 
animal in a positive energy budget (Stephens & Krebs, 1986). 
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METHOD 
Participants 
 Participants consisted of 110 undergraduate students (ideally half male and half 
female, though this is unlikely to occur) enrolled in a general education psychology 
course at Fort Hays State University.  The mean age of participants was 19.92 years (SD 
= 2.98), and a majority of participants indicated their ethnicity as Caucasian (82.28%), 
followed by other/biracial (12.66%), followed by African-American (3.80%), and Native 
American (1.26%).  The sample consisted of 51.25% males and 48.75% females.  
Participants received extra credit or partial fulfillment of research participation credit in 
their respective psychology course(s) for participating in this project; all identifying 
information was removed from the data.  Acceptance of informed consent was collected 
using a radio button, therefore no identifying information was collected during informed 
consent procedures. 
Materials 
 Web application.  The primary purpose of the study was to evaluate a software 
program (see Appendix A for a visual representation) that could be used to present 
decision tasks by other researchers.  This task was programmed to allow flexibility in the 
information presented to participants, that can be easily adjusted by the researcher, and 
was a web-based program, coded using ASP.net in Microsoft® Visual Basic Community 
2013, utilizing a Microsoft® SQL Server database back-end.  The interface was designed 
to be simplistic and easy for participants to understand after very little instruction.  
Participants were presented a binary choice decision task in which the following 
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information was displayed: number of trials remaining, running score (bank amount), 
goal amount, two gambles (Gamble A and Gamble B), payout amounts for each gamble, 
the cost to play each gamble, and feedback about the previous trial. 
 Participants began with a bank amount, a set goal amount, and a total number of 
trials.  Each time a gamble was selected, the budget decreased based on the cost of the 
selected gamble.  If the selection was a “win,” the payout amount corresponding to that 
gamble was then added to the running score.  If the selection was a “loss,” then no points 
were added to the running score.  Each time a selection was made, the remaining number 
of trials decreased by one until the last trial was completed. 
 Generally, people perform better on mathematic tasks when the problems are 
presented using frequencies (Hill & Brase, 2012).  This phenomenon is known as the 
frequency effect, and this effect has many possible explanations such as the “frequency 
hypothesis” that states the world in which man evolved was one abundant with frequency 
information (e.g., Brase et al., 1998; Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Hill & Brase, 2012).  
Following from this hypothesis, a laboratory test that could argue high ecological validity 
should present choice options in such a manner.  The purpose of this study was to create 
such a measure where participants sample the given options, and probabilities are 
determined using naturalistic sampling techniques. 
 The task presented participants with a standard binary choice decision task.  They 
began a certain number of trials in which they could test the two options for their payout 
frequencies.  Participants then used this information to evaluate which option to choose 
with a given number of trials remaining in the task. 
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Procedure 
 Participants were recruited by an announcement in their general education 
psychology course and asked to sign up for a specific date and time to participate in this 
study using Google® Forms.  Upon arrival, they were informed of the purpose of the 
study and reminded of their rights as voluntary participants in research.  Upon 
consenting, the study began.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of four groups, 
determined by beginning budget (high or low) and goal amount (high or low; see Table 
1).  Gamble A presented a 100% chance of winning $100 with a $10 cost to play in every 
condition, and gamble B presented a 55% chance of winning $200 with a $20 cost to play 
in every condition. 
 
Condition Budget Goal Difference 
1 $50 $1800 -$1750 
2 $50 $2700 -$2650 
3 $950 $1800 -$850 
4 $950 $2700 -$1750 
Table 1. Budget and goal amounts corresponding to each of the four conditions and the 
beginning budget-goal difference. 
 
 After reading and agreeing with the terms in the informed consent, demographic 
information was collected from each participant.  Each participant then read an 
instructional page that described the computer application and its use in the study.  Each 
piece of information that was presented in the task (e.g., budget, trials remaining, and 
goal amount) was explained prior to the start of the actual task.  Once participants were 
comfortable with how the program works, they were directed to begin the computer task.  
Every participant completed 20 trials of the computerized decision task. 
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 Upon completion, participants were debriefed and encouraged to ask questions 
about the study.  Each participant was given the option to print a debriefing form that 
contained information about the study and contact information for the research team.  
They were given the option to request results of the study once data has been collected 
and analyzed.  At the conclusion of debriefing procedures, participants were thanked for 
their time, excused from the lab, and the study concluded. 
Data Analysis 
 For each trial in the computer task, every participant contributed data for trials 
remaining, bank amount (budget), observed probability of gamble A, observed 
probability of gamble B, expected value of gamble A, expected value of gamble B, and 
the selected gamble.  Additional variables were calculated, including the difference 
between the budget and the goal (hereafter referred to as budget-goal difference; 
calculated by budget – goal), the expected values of gamble A and gamble B based on 
observed payout frequency (payout amount * observed frequency – cost to play), 
determination of the risky option based on observed payout frequency (hereafter referred 
to as risky option; lower payout frequency is the risky option), and determination of risky 
behavior (coded as 1 = risky and 0 = not risky; determined by matching the selection of 
gamble A or gamble B with the determined risky option). 
 Data were analyzed using a three-step multilevel hierarchical logistic regression.  
Main effects for budget-goal difference, trial number, and sex were entered in the first 
step as predictors and risky option was entered as the criterion.  In the second step, all 
possible two-way interactions (trial number x budget-goal difference; trial number x sex; 
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budget-goal difference x sex) will be entered as predictors with risky option as the 
criterion.  In the third step, the three-way interaction will be entered (trial number x 
budget-goal difference x sex) will be entered as the predictor and risky option as the 
criterion. 
A Primer on Multilevel Regression 
 Researchers are sometimes interested in multiple levels of analysis. Consider, for 
example, a situation where we are interested in academic success of high school students 
from every high school in Kansas, and want to predict that success using prior test scores.  
This presents a unique scenario in which traditional data analysis techniques are unable to 
account for both individual-level variance (each student) and group-level variance (each 
high school) (Gelman & Hill, 2007).  As an example, sex of the students would vary at 
the individual level (and may be a predictor of success), but funding for after-school 
programs would vary at the group, or school, level (and may also be a predictor of 
success for students attending each school).  Traditional models can estimate group 
effects using an indicator variable (e.g., school “A” = 1, school “B” = 2), but this method 
does not allow variation between groups to be modeled.  Simply stated, a multilevel 
regression model seeks to predict an individual outcome based on predictors unique to 
the individual (e.g., sex, age, grades) as well as predictors unique to the group to which 
the individual belongs (e.g., education level of faculty, after school program funding, 
socioeconomic status of school community) where coefficients at each level are allowed 
to vary. 
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 Of particular value to the present research is the ability of multilevel regression 
models to handle repeated measures data (Gelman & Hill, 2007).  In this case, time (trial 
number) would represent a group-level predictor, while sex and difference between 
budget and goal would represent individual-level predictors.  In the main analysis, the 
dependent variable (choice of risky gamble; coded as risky = 1, not risky = 0) was 
regressed onto these predictors using the lme4 package in R©. 
RESULTS 
 Before performing the regression analysis, data were checked for impossible 
values (none found), coding errors, and missing values.  Missing values were found for 
demographic variables for 30 participants.  These participants were included in the main 
analysis, but demographic predictors, specifically sex, should be interpreted with caution 
as data for this variable was not present for all participants. 
 The trial number variable was also centered by subtracting the mean from each 
value.  By centering the scale predictor variables, interaction effects are more easily 
interpreted. 
 Additionally, the budget-goal difference variable was calculated by subtracting 
the goal amount from the current budget.  This allows negative values to be interpreted as 
a budget falling below the goal, and positive values indicate goal achievement.  After 
calculating this variable, it was centered by subtracting the mean from all values.  Then 
the variable was scaled by dividing by 1000 in order to scale the difference variable more 
similarly to the trial number variable. 
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Main Analysis 
 Data were analyzed using a three-step multilevel logistic regression.  In the first 
step, risky choice (coded as risky = 1, not risky = 0) was regressed onto budget-goal 
difference, trial number, and sex (1 = male, 0 = female).  In the first step, budget-goal 
differences (Figure 3) and trial number (Figure 4) were both unique predictors of risk 
preference, but sex was not a unique predictor (see Table 2 for analysis details). 
 
Figure 3. Probability of selecting the risky option predicted by budget-goal difference. 
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Figure 4. Probability of selecting the risky option predicted by trial number. 
 In step two, risky choice was regressed onto all possible two-way interactions: 
trial number X budget-goal difference, trial number X sex, and budget-goal difference X 
sex.  None of the two-way interactions were unique predictors of risk preference (see 
Table 2 for analysis details).  Additionally, the Akaike information criterion (AIC) 
increased from the first step to the second.  This indicates that the model at step two did 
not show an improvement in model fit over step one (Gelman & Hill, 2007). 
 In the third step, risky choice was regressed onto the three-way interaction, trial 
number X budget-goal difference X sex.  The three-way interaction was not statistically 
significant in step three.  As in step two, the AIC increased in step three which indicates 
that fit did not improve with the addition of the three-way interaction. 
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Step Predictor AIC Coefficient p 
1 --- 1725 --- --- 
 (Intercept) --- -1.53 <0.001** 
 B-G Difference --- 0.19 0.034* 
 Trial Number --- -0.08 <0.001** 
 Sex --- 0.34 0.233 
2 --- 1755 --- --- 
 (Intercept) --- -1.80 <0.001** 
 TN * B-G Diff --- -0.01 0.712 
 TN * Sex --- 0.07 0.146 
 B-G Diff * Sex --- -0.02 0.932 
3 --- 1773 --- --- 
 (Intercept) --- -1.82 <0.001** 
 TN*B-G*Gen --- 0.01 0.744 
Table 2. Summary of results from multilevel logistic regression analysis. * denotes p < 
.05, ** denotes p < .001 
 
Exploratory Analysis 
 For exploratory purposes, the dependent variable was recoded to reflect choice for 
lower expected value (EV choice).  The variable was coded as 1 (lower expected value) 
and 0 (higher expected value), and was analyzed using the same predictors as in the main 
analysis. 
 Data were analyzed using a three-step multilevel logistic regression.  In the first 
step, EV choice was regressed onto budget-goal difference, trial number, and sex (1 = 
male, 0 = female).  In the first step, only sex (Figure 5) was a unique predictor of EV 
choice (see Table 3 for analysis details). 
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Figure 5. Selection of lower EV option predicted by sex. 
 
 In step two, EV choice was regressed onto all possible two-way interactions: trial 
number X budget-goal difference, trial number X sex, and budget-goal difference X sex.  
Only trial number X budget-goal difference was a unique predictor of EV choice (see 
Table 3 for analysis details).  Additionally, the Akaike information criterion (AIC) 
increased from the first step to the second.  This indicates the model at step two did not 
show an improvement in model fit over step one (Gelman & Hill, 2007). 
 In the third step, EV choice was regressed onto the three-way interaction, trial 
number X budget-goal difference X sex.  The three-way interaction was not statistically 
significant in step three.  As in step two, the AIC increased in step three which indicates 
that fit did not improve with the addition of the three-way interaction. 
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Step Predictor AIC Coefficient p 
1 --- 1723 --- --- 
 (Intercept) --- -1.49 <0.001** 
 B-G Difference --- 0.06 0.821 
 Trial Number --- -0.04 0.192 
 Sex --- 0.71 0.031* 
2 --- 1731 --- --- 
 (Intercept) --- -2.02 <0.001** 
 TN * B-G Diff --- 0.08 <0.001** 
 TN * Sex --- 0.01 0.818 
 B-G Diff * Sex --- 0.61 0.157 
3 --- 1749 --- --- 
 (Intercept) --- -2.04 <.001** 
 TN*B-G*Gen --- 0.02 0.783 
Table 3. Summary of results from exploratory multilevel logistic regression analysis. * 
denotes p < .05, ** denotes p < .001 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
Main Analysis 
 Budget-goal difference did predict risk preference, and the first hypothesis was 
supported.  As the distance from the budget to the goal increased, the probability of 
selecting the risky option also increased.  This finding aligns well with previous research 
on RST (e.g., Caraco et al., 1980; Stephens, 1981) and supports the idea that organisms 
are willing to assume a greater amount of risk if doing so increases the chance of survival 
(framed as meeting a goal in the present study). 
 As trial number increased (or trials remaining decreased) preference for risk 
actually decreased, which is the opposite of the prediction made in the second hypothesis.  
Though this finding is inconsistent with RST as described by Stephens and Krebs (1986), 
this finding should be interpreted with caution due to possible collinearity issues with 
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trial number and budget-goal difference.  Since both options presented positive EV 
values, the budget-goal difference should, mathematically, approach a surplus value over 
time.  To address this limitation, future research should utilize choice options with 
expected values near zero.  This would reduce collinearity between budget-goal 
differences and trial number and there would be no systematic change over time. 
 There was not a sex difference in regards to risk preferences, and the third 
hypothesis was not supported.  This is contrary to several studies that find greater risk 
preferences exhibited by males than females (e.g., Eckel & Grossman, 2002; Harris, 
Jenkins, & Glaser, 2006).  This does seem to fit with RST, as males and females should 
assume similar amounts of risk when a decision presents life-or-death consequences (e.g., 
starvation). 
 Finally, the main analysis also did not support hypothesis 4, there was no 
significant interaction between budget-goal difference and time.  This makes logical 
sense as the main effect for time was in the opposite direction than expected, so the 
regression lines for budget-goal difference and time had similar slopes.  Theoretically, 
however, this is in opposition to predictions from RST (e.g., Stephens, 1981; Stephens & 
Krebs, 1986) which states that an organism should take more risk under time pressure 
when a need level has not been met.  This behavior could be a mechanism to prolong life 
(avoid starvation) by expending less of the available budget in hopes that an outside 
influence may provide the necessary income.  For example, an organism on the brink of 
starvation may choose to conserve energy, if meeting a need level is no longer possible, 
in hopes of receiving sustenance from an altruistic neighbor.  This would allow the 
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organism to prevent furthering its energy deficit and requiring a smaller donation in order 
to survive. 
Exploratory Analysis 
 Interestingly, when the dependent variable was coded for EV instead of risk, the 
unique predictors from the main analysis were no longer statistically significant.  
Additionally, sex and the interaction between budget-goal difference and time were 
unique predictors of choosing the option with the lower EV. 
 Males were more likely than females to choose the option with the lowest 
observed EV.  This may suggest that females are more sensitive to outcomes in naturally 
sampled environments.  It could also support the idea that males and females approach 
risk differently.  Although the main analysis did not detect a sex difference for risk as it 
was operationally defined (i.e., the more variable of the two options), selecting an option 
with a lower EV could also be a viable definition for risk.  Eckel and Grossman (2008) 
discuss several possible reasons for inconsistencies in findings regarding risk aversion 
and sex including task type and experiment setting.  This finding may further the 
argument for the use of terms describing specific kinds of risk so that comparisons can be 
made across studies.  One potential explanation for this effect, where females seem to be 
more sensitive to expected values of decisions, relates to ancestral foraging.  Historically, 
there has been a sexual division of labor concerning the gathering of food resources; 
males have been responsible for hunting and females have been responsible for foraging 
(Silverman & Eals, 1992).  New, Krasnow, Truxaw, and Gaulin (2007) discuss an 
advantage in navigation that females have over males when foraging for fruits and 
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vegetables.  Though not directly tested in this theory, sensitivity to greater caloric values 
in a single foraging session could moderate the effect of this navigational advantage in 
females.  This effect should be directly examined in future research. 
 Interestingly, budget-goal difference and time interacted to predict the choice of 
the lower EV option.  However, the effect was in the opposite direction of what should be 
expected.  As budget-goal difference increased and time passed, the likelihood of 
choosing the lower valued option increased.  A possible explanation for this effect is a 
lack of sensitivity to payout frequency or a lack of rationality on the part of decision 
makers (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kahnemnan & Tversky, 1984).  This could 
illustrate the lack of consequence for failure to meet the set goal amount, where 
participants lost interest in trying to reach the goal.  In studies with other animals (e.g., 
Caraco et al., 1980), the failure of an animal to reach a minimum need level in terms of 
calories from food would likely result in death, a very serious consequence.  Without a 
consequence for failure to reach the minimum level, the goal amount, participants in this 
study would not be motivated to avoid such a consequence. 
Limitations and Implications 
This study provided support for the frequency hypothesis.  It appears as if 
decision makers were sensitive to the payout frequencies of the provided options, and 
chose the less risky option more often than the risky option.  This would suggest that 
naturally sampled frequency information is more easily processed by the human mind 
than mathematical representations of probability. 
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Second, findings suggested a time component should be included in decision 
tasks, especially since many everyday decisions (e.g., paying rent on time or going out) 
carry with them a deadline of some kind.  The data revealed a strong main effect for time 
on risk preferences, although not in the expected direction.  This variable should be 
examined more closely as it is experienced universally.  The present studied utilized only 
20 time points, but a similar setup could collect many more data points from a single 
participant to establish an even more reliable estimate of the effects of time on risk 
preferences. 
Finally, results supported the necessity of multiple reference points in a single 
decision tasks.  Tri-reference point theory (Wang & Johnson, 2012) is one of the theories 
that attempts to analyze decision processes by using more than a single point of 
reference.  The relationship between the budget and goal amounts was a significant 
predictor of risk preference, but only manipulated two of the three reference points 
described in tri-reference point theory.  Future studies should incorporate all three as 
there is evidence to suggest an effect for two. 
 Most importantly, however, is that the software created for the purposes of this 
study could be used in future research.  The area of judgment and decision-making seems 
to lack an agreed-upon tool by which to assess decision-making behavior.  Many of the 
tasks created are similar, but better comparisons between studies could be drawn if 
scientists can compare results from the same task or set of tasks.  This task adds the extra 
benefit of increasing ecological validity as it relates directly to the frequency hypothesis 
(e.g., Brase et al., 1998; Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Hill & Brase 2012) by asking 
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participants to naturally sample outcomes of the presented options in order to make their 
future decisions. 
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APPENDIX A 
The computerized gamble task: 
 
 
Bank.: 
~000 
GrunbleA 
Cost to Pfar : $100 
Max Pa1out: $211 
Select Gamble A 
Trial Re111au1ing: 
0 
Last Result: 
Grunble B 
Cost to Pila) : $] 0 
Max.Pa 01Lvt: -500 
Select Gamble El 
Goat 
1000 
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